Sexist laws are more prevalent in regions where poverty is endemic. The corollary is true as well: the places where women tend to experience better treatment are typically more highly developed. The legal academy has drawn several inferences from this observation, including the observations that poverty and the development process appear to be detrimental to women's rights. But despite the strength of this relationship, few legal studies seek to understand precisely why gender inequality seems to be inextricably linked to poverty.
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U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 37.4 ciety's basic economic unit-the family. For instance, regions that prohibit women from earning a wage depress the rate of investment since single-income families must approach the market overcautiously. These deductions are then supported by an original empirical analysis, which indicates that gender inequality and poverty are significantly and powerfully connected. Sexist laws are thus less the result of underdevelopment as much as its very cause.
INTRODUCTION
Laws that discriminate against women are-on a global scalevast and diverse. 1 In developing countries, it is commonplace for statutes and rules to prohibit women from, among other things, owning land, 2 inheriting property, 3 obtaining education, 4 and assenting to contracts. 5 Under Swaziland common law, for example, men have sole authority to administer marital property. 6 When a 1188 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 37.4 ioral incentives associated with gender inequality, 15 this article investigates why sexist laws are most prevalent in areas where poverty is endemic. Or, in so many words, what is the law and economics of sex discrimination? Using an original dataset, advanced quantitative methods, and a law and economics approach, this article uncovers a powerful and counterintuitive dynamic: poverty often thrives precisely because of laws that discriminate against women. As will be explained, the family functions as society's foundational economic unit, providing an efficient means for actors to participate in the market. 16 But, in contrast to other forms of discrimination, gender inequality undermines the family structure, discouraging both men and women from engaging in productive economic behaviors. 17 For instance, prohibiting women from earning a wage depresses the rate of investment since single-income families must then approach the market over-cautiously. Sexist laws are not just tangentially related to global poverty but instead one of its greatest determinants.
This article seeks to make several contributions. On a practical level, our findings indicate that attempts to alleviate poverty and underdevelopment must account for the deleterious effects of sex discrimination. Theoretically, this article contributes to the law and economics literature, including a discussion of how sexist legal codes and regulations of the family structure render deleterious behavioral incentives. We also hope that our dataset can support future research projects in light of this subject's current lack of data. 18 But the biggest takeaway is likely our finding that increasing women's rights fulfills more than justice; it is also good business. 15 See Barbara Stark, Women and Globalization: the Failure and Postmodern Possibilities of International Law, VAND. J. TRANSNAT 'L L. 503, 591 (2000) (arguing that the literature has ignored substantial issues of women's economic justice, which is a much greater concern to impoverished women than some human rights issues that have been more keenly examined). See, e.g., Barnali Choudhury, The Façade of Neutrality: Uncovering Gender Silences in International Trade, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 113, 115 -17 (2008) . 16 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 183 (8th ed. 2011) (explaining that the family serves as an economic unit, allowing its members to operate efficiently). 17 Infra Section 3 (discussing how actors must consider not only themselves but also their families when making economic decisions. Laws that discriminate by sex have the effect of disrupting the manner in which decide to spend, save, and invest). 18 Stark, supra note 15, at 526.
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Section II discusses the pervasiveness of legally sanctioned sex discrimination, detailing how certain laws deprive women of economic and legal rights. Special emphasis is given to perhaps the most unforgiving legal code, African customary law. This is followed by a law and economics analysis in Section III, which canvasses the effects of sex discrimination and the process by which it frustrates economics growth and development. Section IV presents empirical research, suggesting that women must gain economic equality or else underdevelopment and poverty will persist. This article then concludes with several policy prescriptions.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION
Gender inequality is ultimately a legal problem. 19 The degree to which women suffer from discrimination is typically the product, or failure, of certain statutes, common law rules, and even international legal authorities. 20 And considering the prevalence of 19 See Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women's Human Rights, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 125, 126 (1994) (noting the comparative deprivation of women, stemming from discriminatory legal codes). See generally Judith Resnick, Opening the Door: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Law's Boundaries, and the Gender of Opportunities, 25 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 81 (2013) (explaining the nexus between the law and sex discrimination). 20 The role of international law and authorities are particularly important in understanding the pervasiveness of global gender inequality. Cook, supra note 19, at 126. Sovereign states may enact and enforce sexist laws with little resistance from the international community. The international community considers gender discrimination to be a nation's prerogative, refusing to pass meaningful reforms potentially in tension with a country's sovereignty. This landscape is especially notable considering the international community's more fervent opposition to racial discrimination. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, A "Benign Apartheid: How Gender Apartheid Has Been Rationalized", 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 237, 239 (2000) (noting that the international community has relatively ignored issues of gender discrimination, relative to racial discrimination); Celestine Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 391 -392 (2000) (finding that, "the minimal presence of women's rights NGOs in rural areas, where the issue of land has greater significance, perpetuates the political/economic rights dichotomy."); Stark, supra note 15, at 531 -32 at 535:
[I]nternational law has failed women in at least two distinct ways, both grounded in its failure to fully and effectively incorporate human rights law. First, on the state level, it has failed to prevent the widespread deprivation of human rights, caused by shredded safety nets, environmental degradation, and other byproducts of globalization, or to alleviate the re-1190 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 37.4 sexist laws in impoverished areas, the occurrence of gender inequality seems to be far from coincidental. 21 This section examines the nature of sexist laws to shed light on their effects on economic behavior. And as will be shown, some societies enforce legal codes, and even entire bodies of law, that can best be described as holistic efforts to subjugate women, rendering profound systemic consequences.
sultant human suffering… Second, international law has failed to compel even the most basic recognition of human rights on the part of the Major Players, that is, non-state actors who are in fact the principal agents of globalization.
Furthermore, the primary, and virtually only, international law regime governing women's rights is the United Nations' Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Id. at 544. Certain CEDAW provisions ostensibly obligate countries to replace discriminatory laws with those guaranteeing women equal rights. Two specific provisions, Articles 2(f) and 5(a), instruct member states to supplant discriminatory laws and practices with modernized institutions prescribing egalitarian treatment. But see Nyamu, at 391 -92 (finding that the accord lacks authority to compel signatories, allowing certain member states-most of which being the worst offenders-to carve out exceptions to key articles; " [m] any Third World states, especially those with an Islamic majority, have, however, made reservations to these articles."); Neuwirth, supra note 1, at 25 ("many parties have ratified CEDAW with reservations specifically intended to protect them from the obligations to repeal sex discriminatory laws in force at the domestic level."); see also Ann Laquer Estin, Religious and Legal Pluralism in Comparative Theoretical Perspective: Family Law, Pluralism, and Human Rights, 25 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 811, 818 (2011) (noting the countries that refused to ratify parts of the CEDAW using language of gender equality). Although a few other intergovernmental organizations-such as the World Bank's Engendering Development program-have sought to bind member states to promoting gender equality, the same problems regarding the lack of enforceability persist. See Rittich, infra note 71, at 584 ("Engendering Development attempts to present a coherent, if flexible, vision of gender equality, one that is organized around ensuring 'basic' rights and enhancing women's market skills and promoting greater voice. Yet there are multiple Lacunae and instabilities in the vision of equality it advances, and numerous possible points of engagement with its claims."). 21 Many of the countries rated as the poorest also provide women with the worst quality of life and the fewest substantive rights. One Newsweek study ranked every country based on women's access to justice, health, education, economic rights, and political rights. The worst countries for women's rights were highly correlated with the International Monetary Fund's listing of countries that have the lowest gross domestic product per capita. For instance, the Democratic Republic of the Congo was considered the poorest country in the world and the third worst for women. Other countries that topped both lists include Niger, Afghanistan, Mali, and Ethiopia.
Best 
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The most common and debilitating types of sexist laws discriminate against women in the workplace and home. 22 Notable examples include a Latin American labor law that allows employers to terminate, or resist hiring, a pregnant woman after administering a compulsory pregnancy testing. 23 Similarly, the Russian Federation enforces an employment statute that prohibits women from working any job found on a list of over 450 occupations requiring physical labor or ostensibly lacking femininity. 24 Chinese employers pay women on average of about 60-70% of male wages for the same work. 25 Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 731 -33 (2011) (discussing how women often have difficulties proving sex discrimination claims because most courts demand sex that these suits identify other employees who received the same and disparate treatment due to their sex).
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U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 37.4 Likewise, under various bodies of family law, a woman who enters marriage stands to lose her citizenship, unable to pass such rights onto her children.
27
Women in some Middle Eastern countries cannot assent to their own marriages 28 and, under Malaysian law, a wife can lose her right to economic support if she disobeys her husband. 29 A Chinese divorce statute effectively vests title of a former couple's marital property in the man's name exclusively, 30 and it was not until recently when Ugandan women gained the right to file for divorce without having to prove certain limited and extreme factors. 31 In fact, some places, including Nigeria, permit domestic violence, literally allowing men to beat their wives into compliance. 32 While sexist laws can operate independently as a discrete means to discriminate, some legal codes entail holistic efforts to deprive women of substantive rights. African customary law falls 27 Stephanie Palo, Citizens after Marriage: Exploring Violations of Women's Nationality Rights, WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 673, 674 (2009) ; see Lisa C. Stratton, Note, The Right to Have Rights: Gender Discrimination in Nationality Laws, 77 MINN. L. REV. 195, 196 -97 (1992) [ Vol. 37.4 The concept of women as property likewise bars African women from owning real property. 43 African regional leaders distribute available community land to local clans with each family's male head as the ultimate beneficiary; 44 because customary law considers women unfit to own real estate, a woman who receives land from her family's patriarch is barred from registering it in her own name. 45 While women may use land to farm, only a man can alienate it on the market or otherwise exploit its economic potential. 46 Furthermore, under most customary intestacy and inheritance laws, when an African woman is widowed, her husband's real INT'L L. 243, 252 (2007) (" [T] he payment of a bride price is akin to purchasing property, giving a man full ownership over his wife. The payment of bride price demeans a woman's status by encouraging men to conceive of their wives as chattel…' After being purchased, women often feel subservient to their husbands, who can do as they wish with their wives. Men may pay for their wives uses several means of payment including chickens and livestock.") (alterations in original). See also Women are Not Men, FREAKONOMICS RADIO (Feb. 14, 2013) , http://freakonomics.com/2013/02/24/women-are-not-men-a-newfreakonomics-radio-podcast/ [https://perma.cc/9NQV-MW4S] (stating that in the Maasi Tribe in Tanzania, the cost of a woman is about ten cows, making wives the property of their husbands). 45 See Nyamu, supra note 20, at 396 ("Women are regarded as lacking the authority to make major decisions concerning land use and cannot inherit land or acquire a share of land following marital dissolution if they were married under customary law . . . African customary laws are used as the primary justification for this exclusion of women: national land registration programs have replicated these socio-cultural conventions. Using the concept of 'male head of household' as the criterion for title registration, most, if not all, title to registered land is individually held in men's names."). 46 See Susana Lastarria-Cornhiel, Impact of Privatization on Gender and Property Rights in Africa, 25 WORLD DEV. 1317, 1321 (1997) (stating that "men control household land because the community authorities have allocated the land to male household heads; these lands are then passed down to male heirs."); see also Pienaar, supra note 33, at 179 -180 ("For most women, access to land depends on their relation to male relatives and the specific laws and practices of the area. Although a husband has an obligation to provide arable land to his wife to farm and decide which specific piece of land the woman can use for how long."). 
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[ Vol. 37.4 assets can rarely obtain loans or other forms of credit, the ability of African women to invest, among other marketplace activities, is severely limited. 55 The UN's African Women's Report determined that the resources available to African women constitutes only forty-four percent of those available to men, illustrating the barriers women face in seeking to improve their social and market standings. 56 Although most African constitutions ostensibly guarantee women equal protection, a number of African supreme courts have held that constitutional protections apply only to statutory laws, as opposed to customary laws. 57 In Magaya v. Magaya, 58 a Zimbabwean court affirmed that "a lady… cannot be appointed [as heir] to [her] father's estate when there is a man" on the grounds that customary law is not subject to constitutional guarantees. 59 Other Rights Education As A Means Of Economic Empowerment For Women In Sub-Saharan Africa, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 329, 330 (1995) ("Without control, access, or the ability to exploit economic resources, women are not able to improve their economic statuses… Thus, each denial of an economic right gives rise to another denial and ensures women have continued economic dependence."). 55 Nyamu, supra note 20, at 397 (citing as an example how "women are often denied a share of marital property after divorce since title to their property is held in their husband's name. Th[is] male bias in land registration also impedes obtaining independent credit."). courts have refused to use constitutional grounds to unsettle customary law out of fear that local authorities would ignore such rulings, undermining the constitution. 60 This occurred in Stephen and Another v. Attorney General, 61 in which a Tanzanian court upheld that women are barred from selling family land in order to guarantee the "sacrosanct nature of the constitution." 62 It thus appears that, despite the clarity of the Tanzanian constitution, the judiciary feared that trumping customary law would serve only to embarrass its constitution. Curiously, in light of the prevalence of sexist laws, it is seldom questioned why discrimination is more prominent in places where underdevelopment and poverty levels are elevated. 63 We find, as the next section demonstrates, that sexist laws create unique burdens on the family structure, rendering perverse incentive structures whereby actors rationally engage in economically inefficient behaviors. Gender inequality is, indeed, not just tenuously related to global poverty, but one of its greatest determinants.
she would get married." The appellate court overruled, holding that the trial court's decision violated the Kenyan constitution as well as CEDAW). [Vol. 37.4
WOMEN, SEXIST LAWS, AND POVERTY: A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE
A law and economics perspective can provide key insights into gender inequality and poverty's relationship by emphasizing the manner in which actors rationally respond to sexist laws. Previously the legal academy has produced several notable findings on the subject, primarily from the law and development and gender and law literatures. For instance, the latter field notes that poverty disproportionally affects women, commonly referred to as the "feminization of poverty." 64 In impoverished regions, women generally earn less, have fewer rights, suffer worse health issues, and are more likely to become victims of violence, among other social and economic ills. 65 But while this research offers important insights, it tends to explore the manner in which gender inequality influences poverty in women and less its overall impact on society.
Moreover, the law and development field 66 primarily studies law and democracy's influence on societal growth, giving less attention to the role of gender equality. 67 And the works that do incorporate women's rights tend to assume that changes in gender 2016]
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equality are the results of certain development policies including trade liberalization, 68 though disagreements persist about whether such policies harm or help women. 69 But despite the strength of these studies, it is seldom considered whether the nature of women's position in society is driving the relationship; 70 in other words, 68 See id. (discussing the relationship between women's rights and development, but assuming "that economic development, in the long run, translates into better protection for human rights than other indicators, such as ratification by states of human rights treaties."); Apodaca, infra note 169, at 160 ("All statistical tests support the conclusion that economic development has a positive effect on women's equality in the enjoyment of economic and social rights."); Lyndsay J. Montour, Connecting the Spheres of Trade and Gender: Creating a Gender-Conscious World Trade Organization, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 397, 400 (2014) ("While trade liberalization does not cause gender inequality, increased trade can significantly change a country's economic conditions, intensifying existing gender-based inequalities."). 69 There is a significant debate in the law and development field about the manner in which the development process affects women's rights. Some find that the process empowers the men currently in charge. See Nyamu, supra note 20, at 396 (explaining that the marketization and commodification of certain facets of the economy, such as land ownership, tend to hurt women in the developing world relative to men, especially male relatives); Nandini Gunewardena, Reinscribing Subalternity: International Financial Institutions, Development, and Women's Marginality, 7 UCLA J. INT'L & FOREIGN AFF. 201, 208 (2003) (arguing that most liberal economic development plans implemented by organizations such as the International Monetary Fund further "colonializes" women in the developing world); S.F. Joireman, The Mystery of Capital Formation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Women, Property Rights and Customary Law, 36 WORLD DEV. 1233, 1238 (2008) (stating that modernizing land titling systems in Africa could put women in a worse place than under customary law systems because this transition may strip them of the few benefits of the land that they presently enjoy); Mahmood Monshipouri, Promoting Universal Human Rights: Dilemmas of Integrating Developing Countries, 4 YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J. 25, 42 (2001) (stating that structural adjustment programs "have routinely imposed unbearable and unjust burdens on the most powerless people of the developing world: women"); Berta E. Hernandez-Truyol, Sex and Globalization, 11 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 173, 174 (2008) (discussing the disproportionate negative social conditions suffered by women and how this can be exacerbated by globalization and economic development). Other works note that women benefit as societies become more developed. See Eric Neumayer, Globalization, Women's Economic Rights and Forced Labor, WORLD ECON. 1510 ECON. , 1531 ECON. (2007 ("Our quantitative analysis of a global sample size suggests that women in countries that are more open to trade enjoy better economic rights and there is less incidence of forced labor in countries more integrated into global markets than in countries that are more closed."); Cao supra note 66, at 366 (discussing the correlation between women's rights and development, but assuming "that economic development, in the long run, translates into better protection for human rights than other indicators, such as ratification by states of human rights treaties."). 70 See, e.g., Kerry Rittich, Transformed Pursuits: The Quest for Equality in Globalized Markets, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 231, 254 -55 (finding that market transformations seeking privatization and liberalization often times harm women). But 1200 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 37.4 most view porous women's rights as the effect of poverty and not its cause. Maybe-as our theoretical treatment and empirical analysis suggest-promoting gender equality spurs growth while subjugating women might actually frustrate development.
The Economics of Laws that Discriminate against Women
We demonstrate, using a law and economics approach, 71 that sexist laws encourage actors, both men and women, to adopt behaviors that hinder development. While it is generally understood that discrimination makes little economic sense, 72 we find that gender inequality is unique because it undermines how families participate in the marketplace. Fundamentally, the family structure operates akin to a business because it allows actors to exploit numerous firm-level benefits, including economies of scale (e.g., buying products more cheaply in bulk), divisions of labor, and ac- (2006) (mentioning in short that "African women have historically suffered from marginalization in term of their legal rights, educational opportunities, participating in public life, and participation in economic life. This has had an adverse effect both on the material conditions of African women and also on the overall economy of the continent."). 71 An economics approach is useful because it assesses societal institutions in a manner that explains aggregate group behavior, producing predictions about systemic (in)efficiencies. At its heart, economics assumes that actors behave rationally, meaning that they tend to choose strategies from all available options, which likely produce the greatest benefits while minimizing costs. How an actor assesses these costs and benefits is dependent upon the institutions under which one operates. If large groups of actors operate under similar conditions, they will likely behave similarly. Gender inequality is often the product of institutions to which rational actors conform their behaviors, producing predictable results. 72 Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance, and Improper Considerations: A CommonLaw Model for the Prohibition of Racial Discrimination in the Contracting Process, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 183, 188 n. 28 (1993) ("Racial discrimination results in highly inefficient uses of society's human resources. Tolerating racial discrimination is tantamount to condoning a type of economic waste."). For a specific example in the context of lending, see generally, Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787 (1995) . In summary, this article states that because bankers are motivated by earning profit, they should loan money when the transaction is likely profitable. Evidence suggests, however, that some bankers deny loans to African-Americans when they otherwise would loan money to white borrowers. Therefore, discrimination makes little sense because some bankers are foregoing making loans even when traditional quantitative indicators suggest that such loans would be profitable.
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HIDDEN EFFECTS OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 1201 tivity specialization. 73 In fact, conceptualizing the family as a business undermines a bedrock assumption of economics whereby actors are autonomous and unitary (meaning that an actor's decisionmaking calculus considers only one's own individual preferences, costs, and benefits). 74 Instead most people participate in the market as part of a family, making choices with the intent of maximizing collective wealth and wellbeing. 75 For example, the decision of whether to accept a job in another city is often predicated on factors such as whether one's children can enroll in an adequate school or one's spouse may earn a satisfactory wage. Thus the family structure frames how most people perceive the market and contemplate economic transactions. However, laws diminishing female economic rights change the costs and benefits of the family structure by placing obstacles in front of those who would otherwise choose to invest or participate in the market. This is problematic because investment is the lifeblood of growing economies-and even stable ones. 76 Since deci-73 POSNER, supra note 16, at 183 ("The persistence of the family as a social institution suggests to an economist that it must have important economizing properties."). ECON. 38, 42 (2002) ("It is generally accepted in the economics literature that investment is a key variable determining economic growth"). Economies develop when the private sector invests. For instance, a firm that endeavors to open a large factory must often contract local construction firms to build its installation. This usually employs local workers to staff its operations, who then spend their earnings on local goods and services. This infusion of capital starts the "multiplier" effect, wherein the same dollars are reused many times, benefitting numerous people and, in effect, growing the capital beyond its 1202 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 37.4 sions to invest are neither random nor constant, 77 the potential for economic growth is maximized when laws and institutions encourage people to invest resources. 78 Depriving women of economic rights has the reverse effect by (1) incentivizing those who would prefer to invest to approach the market overly cautiously, (2) reducing the sum of investable property, (3) discouraging women from investing their sparse resources, and (4) eliminating efficient checks and balances on spending and investing. For example, because investment is inherently a gamble-as those who put up capital always risk losing some or the entire principal-the likelihood that one invests depends upon how much one stands to lose. The greater the potential harm, the less likely an investor proceeds. 79 This is particularly true for those with scant expendable incomes. 80 If a man's spouse and family are face value. The value of a unit of currency can thus render greater benefits than its face value if spent in a vibrant market place. It is also true that actors can elect to not invest or recycle their money, rendering the opposite recessional effect. Ultimately, actors have the option of spending money or saving money. When money is saved, the supply of available capital on the market diminishes. Should enough money not be invested, it can become scarce to the point of causing economic retraction. 77 See Ndikumana, supra note 76, at 397 (suggesting that States with efficient institutions incentivize investment and, in turn, development). For example, countries with highly developed banking industries, legal systems, skilled workers, and sturdy infrastructure reduce transaction costs and increase an investment's rate of return. See, e.g., Stephen Knack & Phillip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207 (2006) (discussing the importance of property rights for investment and growth). On the other hand, De Soto's seminal research on lesserdeveloped countries found that underdeveloped institutions suffocate investment. For instance, underdeveloped land titling and registration institutions prevent land "owners" from proving that they do, in fact, own their land. Assets without clear title cannot be leveraged as collateral to secure a bank loan. Hernando De Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in The West and Fails Everywhere Else, at 40 (2003) ("Without this legal framework of property rights people can effectively do business only with those whom they know or their family."). 78 The process by which a sum of money invested is worth more to the firm and target society than its face value is known as the "multiplier. entirely dependent upon his income, the sole male wage earner will likely engage only in overly conservative economic activities since a bad investment could devastate his family. For example, women in developing nations are commonly forced to work in the non-wage earning agricultural sector. 81 In these societies, families perceive potential investments as being costlier than those living in societies where secondary sources of incomes lessen the risks of a failed investment, depressing the rate of investment. Limiting female economic rights also creates few incentives for women to build wealth. Discriminatory intestacy and inheritance laws, for instance, disincentive women from engaging in wealth creation since women cannot directly receive or retain earnings rendered in the event of their husband's death. 82 Likewise, women have less incentive to become a small business owner if their husbands can claim and control the resulting revenue. 83 Said differently, discriminatory laws encourage women who would otherwise become active in the market to forebear, considering that they can only reach a small portion of a transaction's benefits. And those earnings can be claimed and squandered by her husband. 84 Thus a rational actor accounting for her own, or her family's, best interest will have little reason to risk scarce assets when the cost of investing outweighs any limited, expected returns, discouraging greater market activity. opportunities like in Western countries. Indeed, actors engage in economic transactions when the investment should render adequate returns, considering the nature of the risk. Naturally, "peasants" are more likely to forebear from investing when resources are scarce because of the increased risks). 83 See Michael Kevane, WOMEN AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: HOW GENDER WORKS, 31 (2004) (stating that women "who want to become an entrepreneur will think twice. Her husband will have first rights to all of her profits."). 84 See, e.g., Sihlongaonyane, C.N. 470/2013A, at 8 -9 (discussing a Swazi common law rule which identifies the man as the sole administer of marital property).
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U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 37.4 A third factor is that when women lack economic rights, half of the population is functionally barred from investing. 85 Seminal research by the economist Hernando De Soto found that lesser developed countries are impeded from developing due to the amounts of "dead capital" found therein. 86 De Soto's primary theory concerns the lack of written land titles in developing countries, which prevents landowners from proving good title. 87 Absent proof of ownership, landowners can rarely obtain loans and thus invest, resulting in stunted development. 88 In a similar fashion, customary law bestows women a right to license land for the purposes of farming and cultivation, but bars outright ownership. 89 And without the right to alienate land, all land controlled by women is removed from the marketplace, 90 diminishing a country's overall sum of investable assets and attendant rate of investment. 91 In other words, permitting women to occupy and use land, but barring outright ownership, acts as a market regulation stunting investment without providing a reciprocal benefit.
Furthermore, it appears that providing women with at least some authority over family income serves as a check and balance on spending, which helps to cultivate economic growth. Commentators note that, in societies harboring severe gender inequality, women are more likely to spend resources on socially productive goods and services (when given the ability to spend resources). The common explanation is that since women are more frequently tasked with household chores, agricultural production, and child rearing, they invest in goods benefiting the entire family. 92 (2003) ("Dead Capital exists because . . . converting a physical asset to generate capital-using your house to borrow money to finance an enterprise, for example-requires a very complex process." However, "80 percent of the world is undercapitalized; people cannot draw economic life from their buildings (or any other asset) to generate capital."). 87 Id. at 153 ("Nearly every developing and former communist nation has a formal property system. The problem is that most citizens cannot gain access to it."). wise, research also suggests that men are more likely to spend money on goods benefiting solely themselves. 93 In fact, men are probably more likely to spend family money on capricious activities precisely because women lack a vote, veto, or even voice. Thus expanding the range of family actors who can control resources from beyond men to also their wives-who generally serves as a proxy voice for their children-increases the socially beneficial uses of family resources.
The Case of South Korea
This truism's corollary is also accurate; encouraging women to become full players in the marketplace can unleash a nation's full economic potential. In South Korea, for example, economic growth overcame poverty only after women entered the market. 94 As background, during both Korea's Chosun period (1392-1897) and Japanese colonialism , women were subjugated, as poverty and inefficiency prevailed. 95 Korea historically adhered to a Confucian culture emphasizing namjon yobi, or "honored men and subservient women." 96 A strict legal hierarchy resulted in which the loan . . . [F] amilies benefited more when the women controlled the loan money. Loans to women have a greater impact on household expenditures and the education levels of female children. Child survival increases twenty times more and child nutrition improves by 4 to 8% more than with loans to men."). 93 See Radhika Coomaraswamy, Identity Within: Cultural Relativism, Minority Rights and the Empowerment of Women, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 483, 504 (2002) ("Women often enhance the welfare of the family if given control of the family finances. Studies have shown that husbands often keep up to 90% of their earnings for their own consumption, while a wife and mother would likely spend the majority of her earnings on the children."). 94 Many factors can be credited for Korea's growth and most of them are not unrelated to each other. To be sure, democratization, export-focused trade policy, and the later investment in human capital were important. However, the growth of Korean investment in relationship to the rise of women as economic actors is remarkable and informative. 95 See CHARLES R. FRANK, JR ET AL., SOUTH KOREA 8 (1975) Women have long held a low social status in Korean society. Until recently the concept of namjon yobĭ (honoured men and subservient women) was so firmly embedded in Korean people's psyche, both male and 1206 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 37.4 women were seldom considered independent people. 97 Women had to obtain their husband's or male relative's permission to enter most commercial transactions and other legal arrangements. 98 And akin to African customary law, 99 women were excluded from the wage-earning workforce, relegated to the primary sector (i.e., agriculture). 100 While a man could control and collateralize marital assets, women lacked the right to inherit 101 or own personal property. 102 Upon gaining independence after World II, South Korea promoted manufactured exported goods in hopes of reforming the country's stagnant economy. 103 The demand for labor grew as facfemale, that it provided a simple explanation for the severe gender inequality that has prevailed in all sectors of society. It was derived from the Confucian ethics and cosmology, which governed every aspect of daily life during the Choson dynasty (1392 -1910) . Under Confucianism, woman had no rights to own or inherit property, which meant financially she had to depend on her father before marriage, her husband after marriage and her eldest son after her husband's death. KOREAN DEVELOPMENT 103 (1999) . 97 Ross, supra note 95, at 109 ("At the turn of the twentieth century, Korea had a highly patriarchal culture: females were not given their own names, girls were separated from boys beginning at age 6, and women were not allowed to enter the streets of Seoul during the daytime."). 98 GILLS, supra note 96, at 103 (remarking that women "were required by law to obtain the 'permission' (not consent) of their husbands for their public activities, for example, for employment. Any legal arrangement by a wife would be nullified if it was not 'permitted' by the husband."). POL. 127, 132 (1993) ("[T] he proportions of women employed in the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors in 1963 were 69, 7, and 24 percent, respectively."). 101 Hogarth, supra note 96, at 143 ("the law of succession established by the colonial government revoked the previous rights of inheritance for women . . . The modern law of succession under the colonial government, however, precluded female members of the household from any right to inheritance."). 102 See GILLS, supra note 96, at 103 ("while men possessed legal rights to manage, use and even take profits from a wife's property, a woman required her husband's consent even in the disposal of her own property."). Importantly, the entrance of Korean women into the marketplace substantially altered and improved the country's economy.
; DONG-SOOK SHIN GILLS, RURAL WOMEN AND TRIPLE EXPLOITATION IN
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during Korean industrialization when the country sought to promote export manufactured goods). 109 Barriers to female activity have been largely replaced with government policies designed to encourage female contributions to the marketplace. For example, the Korean legislature guaranteed women full inheritance rights in 1990. Hogarth, supra note 96, at 146. Additionally, the Gender-Equality Act in 1987 promised equal employment opportunities regarding recruiting and promotion; Yana van der Meulen Rodgers, A Reversal of Fortune for Korean Women: Explaining the 1983 Upward Turn in Relative Earnings, 46 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 727, 728 (1998) ; see also Suvendrini Kakuchi, Despite Gains, South Korean Women Still Struggle for Equality, IPS (June, 29, 2010) , http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews =51994 [https://perma.cc/LMQ4-ZGPJ] ("South Korea also has a law that requires the government to support women entrepreneurs and extend financial subsidies to career-interrupted women who want to engage in economic activities."). 110 Hogarth, supra note 96, at 145 ("Korean women have learned about the power of money in the modern times through experience, and have become obsessed with money, seeing it as a means to achieve their liberation."). 111 Id. at 144. 112 Yana van der Meulen Rodgers, supra note 109, at 727 ("[W]omen's investment choices will, in turn, affect the future productivity of Korea's economy.").
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U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 37.4 Keeping in mind that investment and credit is critical for growth, as female economic activity increased, the amount of domestic credit in private and public sectors grew. 
EMPIRICAL STUDY
From a research design viewpoint, our analysis is intended to explain whether a significant, causal relationship exists between poverty and sex discrimination-and if so, its nature. There is the possibility that poverty and gender inequality are statistically unrelated and thus have no effect on each other. Likewise their connection could also be "spurious," meaning that neither phenomenon is causing the other despite appearing correlated. 118 instance, the presence of antiquated and inefficient institutionswhich are prevalent in developing nations 119 -could be the actual cause of both poverty and discrimination. 120 If this were the situation, then the assumption that sex discrimination is neither causing nor caused by poverty would prove accurate. But it is this article's contention, as described in our law and economics analysis, that gender inequality depresses investment and other important marketplace activities, causing underdevelopment. This is what our empirical analysis is structured to affirm or refute.
Research Design
We constructed a dataset to investigate the causes of poverty by combining data provided by the World Bank's World Development Indicators 121 and the CIRI Human Rights Data Project. 122 Our unit of analysis includes every nation in the world from 1981 to 2011. 123 Our primary expectation is that sexist laws frustrate the manner in which people invest, leading to poverty and underdevelopment. In light of this theory, we performed two statistical models, the first of which tests the relationship between sexist laws and investment (Model 1) and the second measures sexist laws and poverty's relationship (Model 2). In other words, our analysis uses two separate dependent variables, one for each of the two models since we are seeking to understand the causes of both. Independthe nature of the defendant, noting that the type of crimes for which some defendants are more commonly arrested can produce a spurious relationship).
1210
U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 37.4 ent variables are all of the factors that might affect, or cause, a dependent variable to change. Here, sex discrimination is the primary independent variable because we are hypothesizing that sexist laws have a powerful yet understudied relationship with the dependent variables, poverty and investment. Thus, our statistical analysis seeks to explain whether there is a relationship between sexist laws and both poverty and investment-and if there is such a relationship, its nature and magnitude.
To accomplish this goal, our empirical analysis is designed to isolate the relationship between poverty and sex discrimination. This isolation is important because unrelated variables can appear related if the research design fails to include whichever variables are actually causing the relationship. For example, the sale of ice cream and crime are correlated, but not because ice cream causes people to break the law. Instead, hot weather causes the rate of both to rise, making ice cream and crime appear linked. To avoid finding such a spurious relationship, our statistical models include numerous independent variables (i.e., control variables) that might be influencing poverty and/or underdevelopment. After controlling for these other causes, if sex discrimination appears strongly related with poverty and investment, then we can deduce that they are actually related to a certain degree of statistical certainty. In fact, we can assume that one variable is likely causing the other.
The first model's dependent variable reflects changes in investment, which is measured by the Domestic Credit to the Private Sector provided by Banks. 124 This variable is critical because our theory suggests that sexist laws depress the rate of investment (leading to poverty). Studying the effects of gender discrimination on investment thus provides necessary insights into its ultimate relationship on poverty. The second model's dependent variable is poverty/development (or lack thereof), represented by Per Capita GDP. This is because we are suggesting that sexist laws ultimately produce poor economic performance, which can be captured by Per Capita GDP. Each dependent variable is drawn from World Bank data.
The primary independent variable, women's rights, is measured by the degree of liberty (or lack thereof) that women enjoy in the 124 Domestic Credit to the Private Sector measures financial resources provided to the private sector by deposit taking corporations other than central banks.
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1211 public spheres of a given nation. This variable is derived from a dataset by Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, who compiled the Cignarelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. 125 We drew three independent variables from the CIRI dataset-Women's Economic Rights, Women's Political Rights and Women's Social Rightswhich are all coded on a scale of zero (from least protective of women's rights/most hostile to women) to three (women granted full and equal access to the same rights and privileges as men). 126 Women's Economic Rights per country includes such factors as "equal pay for equal work," "free choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent," and "the right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace". The variable is coded within four categories. The first pertaining to economics rights: (0) There are no economic rights for women under law, and systematic discrimination based on sex may have been built into the law.
(1) There are some economic rights for women under law, but these rights are not effectively enforced (2) Women had some economic rights under law, and the government effectively enforced these rights in practice while still allowing a low level of discrimination against women in economic matters. 125 The CIRI dataset was created using data from the United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. The Human Rights Reports provide detailed information about the worldwide status of women, amongst other human rights concerns, allowing Cignarelli, Richards, and Clay to perform a content analysis of each country's treatment of women. FAQ, CIRI HUMAN RIGHTS DATA PROJECT, http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/faq.html [https://perma.cc/9J4D-LJ55] (last visited Mar. 12, 2015) . Note that for rights dealing with freedom from extrajudicial killing, disappearance, torture, and political imprisonment, CIRI also utilized Amnesty International's Annual Report. However, our article does not make use of these CIRI variables. [Vol. 37.4 (3) All or nearly all of women's economic rights are guaranteed by law. In practice, the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws in practice. 127 The second, women's Political Rights, includes rights such as the right to vote, the right to join political parties, and the right to run for and hold elected public offices. The variable is coded as follows:
(0) Women's political rights were not guaranteed by law during a given year.
(1) Women's political rights were guaranteed in law, but severely prohibited in practice.
(2) Women's political rights were guaranteed in law, but were still moderately prohibited in practice.
(3) Women's political rights were guaranteed in both law and practice. 128 Women's Social Rights is a catch-all category containing a number of rights including rights relating to family law such as the right to initiate a divorce and the right to inherit property as well as freedom from genital mutilation, freedom from forced sterilization, and the right to travel abroad. This variable is coded as followed:
(0) There were no social rights for women in law and that systematic discrimination based on sex may have been built into law.
Women had some social rights under law, but those rights were not effectively enforced.
Women had some social rights under law, and the government effectively enforced those rights in practice while still allowing a low level of discrimination against women in social matters.
All or nearly all of women's social rights were guaranteed by law and the government fully and vigorously enforced those laws in practice. 129 We then created an additive variable, combining all three variables into one, more universal, Women's Rights variable.
As previously mentioned, statistical models can misrepresent a studied relationship (e.g., finding that a strong relationship be- 
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tween two variables exists when they are, in fact, unrelated) if the researcher omits the actual causal variable(s) from the study. To avoid this error, we added control variables, such as Democracy. This is substantially important control variable because democracy is considered a prominent causal force in inciting development.
Research has found that economies grow better in democracies because foreign investors feel more secure investing in democracies, the nature of democratic governments provide more public goods, and local leaders are less likely to steal or otherwise be corrupt. 130 We were thus concerned that a women's rights variable would act as a proxy for democracy, rather than control for an independent effect of female discrimination. This study's democracy variable was adapted from the Polity IV dataset. Countries received scores ranging from 10 (perfect democracy) to -10 (perfect autocracy). The variable was calculated by measuring certain qualities that are common to either government type, such as the range of freedoms that one has or the amount of checks and balances on the executive branch leader. We also control for several economic variables. For example, high inflation diminishes investment because market confidence decreases when their money's value drops relative to the goods and services they seek to purchase. Others lose resources necessary to invest when inflation increases. 131 Therefore, we added a variable from the World Bank, GDP deflator, reflecting the rate of inflation. Similarly, we considered variables pertaining to the availability of credit, including domestic credit provided by the financial sector, domestic credit to private sector by banks and domestic credit to private sector by financial corporations because-all things being equal-investment should be greater when capital is cheaper. 132 130 See Jensen, supra note 79, at 2 -3 (noting that foreign investors are more likely to prefer investing in democracies); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, & James D. Morrow, THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL (2004) (discussing that democracies incentivize the creation of public goods and other behaviors that encourage economic growth and development). 131 See Ndikumana, supra note 76, at 382 ("External debt, public sector borrowing from the domestic financial system, the black market premium, and inflation negatively affect domestic investment."). When interest rates rise, investment falls, and it is not hard to see why. Businesses must borrow to finance most investment, and the interest rate dictates how much firms must pay for that privilege.").
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U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 37.4 Also considering that consumer and investor confidence likely play a strong role in individual investment behavior, we included a variable for GDP growth. Indeed, people are more willing to risk their money in the market when the market seems filled with promise. 133 To account for the overall robustness of a country's GDP we accounted for GDP in current US Dollars. Additionally, international economic phenomena can infuse capital and thus create growth. For instance, countries that are more tied into the world's economic system are more likely to develop at a steady rate in line with world growth. The corollary is also true that more isolated nations tend to experience difficulties developing. Thus we included several international variables, such as a country's receptiveness to international trade (or economic openness), measured by trade as a percentage of GDP. 134 We added a handful of additional potentially causal variables, such as central government debt (percentage of GDP) since government spending can crowd out domestic investment. 135 Keeping in mind the uniqueness of oil producing states, we added a variable measuring a nation's oil rents as percentage of their GDP. 136 Finally, as a proxy for industrialization and stability, we included a variable measuring the infant mortality rate. It is critically important to control for this concept since women's rights is likely linked to development. Thus it would be problematic to measure women's rights without adding a control for a nation's level of development.
Our model controls for the passage of time using the variable years since it is possible that most states have seen improvement in their infrastructures and economies in the past several decades. As a result, we want to make sure that whatever results we see are being driven by how each state treats citizens on the basis of gender, not merely a general influence of modernization.
We tested the time series data using a heavily modified version of an ordinary least squares ("OLS") analysis. Oftentimes, OLS is the appropriate test for linear relationships (such as this). 137 For the present study, though, a modified version of OLS is the proper statistical tool, since the analysis of large collections of data spanning many years is not without risks. Indeed, the models use what is known as time series data, which contains a series of observations collected over a period of time. 138 One of the benefits of a time series model is that it cannot only accurately pinpoint past instances of a nation's economic fortunes waxing or waning when women gained greater liberty and freedom, but it also provides more accurate and predictive models. 139 Some of the potential problems with this model include hetereoskedasticity 140 or data that is "trended" too strongly with the passage of time. This occurs when a studied relationship (e.g., the connection between sexist laws and poverty) changes over the years; if the world is generally treating women better and becoming richer-although the two 137 To be more specific, it is appropriate for a linear relationship without multicollinearity. A linear relationship exists when the relationship can be represented by a straight line, as in every unit input has the same output. Multicollinearity is a problem whereby the independent variables are related to each other, which skews results.
138 Time series models are used in a variety of fields that endeavor to track a phenomenon over the course of years. For instance, time series models first gained prominence in forecasting economic conditions. See generally John R. 139 See Bani-Yaghoub et al., supra note 138 (stating that a "prediction of temporal variations of an observation is a natural ability of time series modeling"). 140 Heteroskedasticity is the phenomenon of a variable's variability (or the range of values within that value) being unequal over the range of the variable being used to predict it. This occurs when the standard deviations of a variable are non-constant over a period of time. Linear regression models, including models centered on OLS regressions, assume normal distribution of standard errors. This means that OLS models run using hetereoskedastic data can produce results with biased standard errors. While one need not disregard all results drawn from such models, it is safe to say that one should approach drawing conclusions from OLS models run with heteroskedastic data with caution. 1216 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 37.4 events are unrelated-then we must statistically account for this possibility. 141 Thus we modified an OLS regression using quadratic regressions, which statistically isolate our variables from the general trend of time; or, one could say we made them stationary. 142 We then ran a series of statistical treatments on our data, controlling for the effects of heteroskedasticity and time-dependent effects oftentimes plaguing time-series data. We then needed to add additional statistical steps in order to alleviate any concerns that we were drawing inferences from biased results. In order to remedy this situation, we included the Huber-White estimator of variance in our models and obtained robust (heteroskedasticityconsistent) standard errors. 143 These empirical methods rendered powerful deductions, which are likely undistorted by intervening variables and the passage of time.
Results
Our results are strong and promising. 144 In interpreting these results, the coefficients indicate the direction and magnitude of the relationships between the independent and dependent variables, and the R-squared identifies the statistical strength of the entire mod-141 Said differently, it is possible that certain results are being driven by a cumulative effect caused by the passage of time. 142 To make our data stationary, we tested each of our variables using quadratic regressions, to see which variables contained time-trend patterns. We then detrended those variables and produced predicted values. These predicted variables were predictions of the value of each variable, divorced from the trends caused simply by the passage of time. Heteroskedasticity, 48 ECONOMETRICA 871 (1980) . This additional step will allow us to better trust the results of our models, and thus draw more accurate conclusions from those results. 144 Women's Rights was found to be strongly statistically significant in the predicted direction with each of the two independent variables. Even controlling for other factors that can, and do, spur economic growth, we can see that the more rights women have in society, including full participation in the marketplace and full protection of the law, the greater the wealth per citizen in society. Similarly, the more women are viewed and protected as full participants in the marketplace, the greater the sums of money that banks will be willing to provide as credit to the society. Our other independent variables generally likewise perform in predicted directions. For additional information, please see the appendix to this piece.
el. 145 In the first model [See Table 1 ], we find that women's rights was significant on societal levels of investment, which is a key determinant of poverty. Indeed, women's rights was significant at better than a .01 level, meaning that there is less than a one percent chance that this statistical relationship is coincidental. This also indicates that as women gain rights, the level of investment grows. The converse is also true; throughout the years, a diminishment of women's rights leads to significant reductions in national levels of investment. We tested this proposition among all countries-both developed and developing-and many years. This model also controlled for most intervening factors that could muddle the analysis. 146 In fact, most control aspects of development were found to be significant in the expected directions. Of special importance was the fact that women's rights remained significant even after controlling for democracy and the proxy for development. This suggests that the status of women has a very special effect on investment that can be separated from other things often related to 145 The degree of significance of each variable is reflected by the number of asterisks attached to the coefficient. A statistically significant relationship indicates that-to whichever degree reflected by the asterisks-the two variables are correlated by some level greater than chance. They, in fact, likely have a causal relationship. Whether a coefficient is positive or negative represents the direction of the relationship; for example, a positive coefficient between women's rights and investment indicates that increasing women's rights leads to greater investment (while a negative coefficient would mean that increasing women's rights depresses investment). The results were instructive.
146 Natural resources, openness to trade, a growing economy and credit provided by banks and the financial sector are all significantly and positively associated with a high per capita GDP. We also see infant mortality significantly and negatively correlated with per capita GDP. This, too, stands to reason as a nation with a robust economy will have those conditions necessary to ensure the health and well-being of those newly born. The fact that debt has no significant relationship with per capita GDP is also rational. The past several decades have seen both nations with thriving economies and nations with weak economies accumulate debt or engage in deficit spending. As a result, there should not be a strong relationship between these factors.
One puzzling relationship is that between the per capita GDP of a nation and the amount of domestic credit to the private sector. It could be that in a more healthy economy, the financial sector and banks are contributing capital to the private sector, while in a less healthy state we see alternate entities, such as foreign exchange companies and private, non-bank money lenders, engaging in the lion's share of lending practices. The significant, negative relationship between trade and the amount of credit provided by banks may require further analysis, as other indicators in Model 1 do perform in expected directions. In sum, this analysis suggests that, similar to the Korean case study, investment is substantially hindered when women are unable to exercise the same economic rights as men.
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U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 37.4 more egalitarian societies. It thus seems clear that oppressing women substantially affects economic behavior, promoting poverty and underdevelopment. Adding confidence to our study was that the model's overall strength was strong and the control variables acted as expected. Also importantly, in the second model, women's rights was significantly related to poor economic performance. We assumed that this would be the case since depriving women of fundamental rights harms investment. But it seemed important to run these tests proving the second step, stunted growth and poverty, actually follow. Indeed, our second model's results clearly indicate-at a high level of statistical significance-that sexist laws actually cause poverty by undermining efficient economic behavior. These findings should contribute to the prior understandings of gender inequality.
It can also be argued that the impact of improving women's economic or legal standings in a nation is unlikely to have an immediate impact on a nation's economic wellbeing. In other words, it will take time for the changes in the legal protection of women to impact a nation's economic fortunes. To address this concern, we ran the models again, but this time adding a lag to our independent variable of interest, women's rights. Model 3 uses Per Capita GDP as the dependent variable, while model 4 uses Bank Credit. These models continue to affirm our original theory. 147 Thus, our research seems to support the theory that developing countries are often mired in poverty precisely because they enact and enforce sexist laws-rather than female subjugation being an unfortunate byproduct of poverty.
POLICY SUGGESTIONS
This article's findings suggest that sexist laws must be reformed in order to catalyze development and economic growth. This is, with little doubt, a difficult task. Societies progress in slow, 147 These models, too, are derived with robust standard errors. Each model continues to perform in accordance with our hypotheses. A noteworthy change does take place in model 3; infant mortality rates, already significant using the unlagged women's rights additive variable, has become more strongly so, from proving significant at the .10 level to being significant at the .05 level.
path-dependent ways. The inertia of change is often predicated on what previously occurred. 148 Thus societies only rarely evolve in ways that are in contradiction with the recent past. 149 However, like in the example of South Korea, sometimes an event, new policy, or phenomenon sparks change. 150 Thus, the challenge is to find policy proscriptions that can reverse the course of women's economic rights.
The South Korean case study suggests that even moderate increases in women's rights can improve the economy. 151 Indeed, the entrance of women into the wage-earning sector was empowering since an earned income, despite its meagerness, provided women with the capacity to participate in the market. Korean women eventually took control over home finances, built investment networks, and catalyzed South Korea's growth through investment. A study of the garment industry in Bangladesh reached similar conclusions. Historically, Bengali women were largely barred from the wage-earning sector, considered dependent upon their husband or other male relative for financial caretaking. 152 But after the rise of the female manufacturing industries, "[t]he most frequently cited benefit of their employment from their personal perspective related to the greater sense of self-reliance it gave them, the lessening of the burden on their families and their ability to stand on their own feet." 153 This suggests that increasing the rights and roles of women in the workplace often inspires women to participate in the market. And by incentivizing women to grow as economic actors, the economy can be expected to follow suit.
Furthermore, some organizations in lesser-developed countries issue microcredit, which are small loans bearing minimal interest rates. A study of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh found that par-148 Douglass C. North, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 6 -9 (1990) (explaining that institutions and societies often develop in path dependent ways). 149 Id. 150 Supra notes 94 -117 and accompanying text. 151 See supra Section 3.2 (using South Korea as an example to illustrate the relationship between economics and gender inequality). 152 See Naila Kabeer and Simeen Mahmud, Globalization, Gender and Poverty: Bangladeshi Women Workers in Expert and Local Markets, 16 J. INT'L DEV. 93, 1085 (2004) ("[S] ociety . . . defines men as the primary, and even sole, breadwinners and privileges male access to employment, women historically have been defined, and have experienced themselves, as dependents."). 153 Id.
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HIDDEN EFFECTS OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 1221 some women may be, in part, self-excluded from the marketplace if they rarely receive messages suggesting that their involvement is socially appropriate. Thus education programs are possibly a necessary first step to overcome such economic barriers. This process could be especially influential if women are inspired to take a more prominent role in the marketplace. Other potentially effective ideas include subsidizing childcare, as has been done in Colombia. 160 This provides women, who are often tasked with primary parenting responsibilities, the capacity to participate in market activities, especially outside of the home. 161 Another issue concerns the manner in which women are more likely to suffer from certain medical and health issues. 162 In fact, elevated health related issues are seen as a general impediment to African development, though women seem to disproportionately suffer. 163 Recognizing and improving women's health issues in developing nations is an objective that can be pursued by both local and international actors. Also suggested is that promoting primary and secondary education in girls-a rate that is very low in developing nations-can help inspire confidence and ability to demand and exercise economic rights. 164 Furthermore, the most difficult, though likely effective, goal would be to increase female representation in government. 165 Currently, in most developing 1222 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 37.4 countries, women are subjugated because the men make the rules. However, despite the present barriers to legislative office, it appears that concentrated movements in certain develop countries and regional organizations are increasing female political participations. 166 Thus, all things considered, there are a multitude of steps that can be taken to help encourage women's rights and, in turn, catalyze growth and development.
CONCLUSION
This article responds to the phenomenon that sexist laws are more commonly enacted and enforced in impoverished regions. These types of statutes oftentimes limit the ability of women to participate equally in the workplace and at home. Some literature assumes that women can expect greater fundamental rights as soon as their region experiences economic development, other works suggest that such development can actually further harm women; this work responded to this debate and addressed questions about the general correlation between sex discrimination and poverty by seeking to understand why gender inequality is commonly associated with underdevelopment in the first place.
Using a law and economics approach, it was asserted herein that the incentive structures created by sexist laws can offer valuable insights into this relationship. Notably, it was found that gender inequality harms the family structure. This can devastate chances of development because the family structure can be viewed as an effective economic unit, providing incentives for acArab women remain effectively disenfranchised from the salient processes that shape governance in their respective states."). 166 Aili Mari Tripp, Creating Collective Capabilities: Women, Agency, and the Politics of Representation, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 2019 (2010) ("Women have been integral to efforts to advance themselves in the political arena . . . In various African countries such as South Africa, Namibia, Uganda, Kenya and Sierra Leone, there are 50/50 movements advocating that women claim half of all parliamentary seats. International and regional bodies, including the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the U.N. Beijing Conference on Women, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and others have also encouraged the adoption of measures to promote women's parliamentary representation. Some regional organizations, like the aforementioned SADC, set targets for their member states: for example, women representatives in SADC member states are to hold fifty percent of legislative seats by the year 2015."). 
